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ABSTRACT
Domain extension in mathematics occurs whenever a given mathematical
domain is augmented so as to include new elements. Manders argues that the
advantages of important cases of domain extension are captured by the model-
theoretic notions of existential closure and model completion. In the specific case
of domain extension via ideal elements, I argue, Manders’s proposed explanation
does not suffice. I then develop and formalize a different approach to domain
extension based on Dedekind’s Habilitationsrede, to which Manders’s account
is compared. I conclude with an examination of three possible stances towards
extensions via ideal elements.
1. INTRODUCTION
In field theory, algebraic number theory, and Galois theory, one often studies
number domains of the form Z[
√
2], Q[i], R(i), etc. These are number domains
which are obtained from Z, Q, and R, respectively, by adjoining new elements.
This means the new elements are added to the old structure and then the
mathematician works in the structure that results when the expanded domain
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is closed under the operations that were already defined on the old domain. A
similar procedure can be carried out in geometry. There one can view the pro-
jective plane as obtained by adding points and lines at infinity to the standard
Euclidean plane and then closing the structure under, e.g., linear transforma-
tions. Historically, certain successful cases of such domain extensions have come
to be referred to as extensions via ideal elements (see the discussion on ideal
elements in the writings of Dedekind, but also Gauss, Veronese, and others,
contained in [Cantù, 2013], summarised below in §2).
The philosophical significance of ideal elements and of the method of ideal
elements has mainly been discussed in the context of Hilbert’s philosophy of
mathematics [cfr. Detlefsen, 1993; Hallett, 1990; Stillwell, 2014]. In his 1919 lec-
ture ‘The role of ideal entities’ [Hilbert, 1992, pp. 90–101], Hilbert characterises
the method of ideal elements as consisting in moving from a given ‘system’ in
which the handling of certain questions is complicated to one where such ques-
tions become simple to handle (op. cit., pp. 90–91). In addition, the new system
contains a subsystem isomorphic to the old system. Thus, at least accord-
ing to Hilbert, ideal elements are introduced to simplify certain mathematical
problems, while preserving the old setting in which the problems arose.
Besides Hilbert, though, other mathematicians such as Poncelet (see for
example [Chemla, 2016]), Kummer, and Dedekind [Cantù, 2013] talk of ideal
elements; this suggests that domain extension via ideal elements was perhaps
understood as a mathematical technique even before Hilbert. Other than the
already cited treatments of ideal elements in the context of Hilbert’s philos-
ophy, a systematic investigation of what makes domain extensions successful,
and domain extensions via ideal elements in particular can only be found in
[Manders, 1989], where Manders sketches an account for domain extension.
Manders argues that extended domains are productive to work with, because
they are the existential closure of the original domain. In other words, for an
extended domain to count as a good domain extension it is sufficient that it be
the existential closure of the domain it extends.
In this paper, however, I will argue that if we understand ideal elements
as heuristic tools affording the mathematician certain pragmatic or epistemic
advantages, Manders’s proposed explanation of the fruitfulness of domain
extensions can only be a partial one, since it cannot explain some histori-
cally important cases of domain extension via ideal elements. I will then turn
to a different approach to domain extension inspired by Dedekind [1854] and
defend the view that, if interpreted correctly, it can provide a framework for
the domain extensions motivated by closure under properties and operations.
Given the historical context in which [Dedekind, 1854] was written, in §6 I
explore the question of how this second criterion fares with respect to concur-
rent developments in number theory. I conclude (§§7, 8) that the comparison
between Manders’s framework and mine leaves us with three distinct options
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2. IDEAL ELEMENTS
Cantù [2013] offers a historically informed reconstruction of the role ideal
elements play in a mathematician’s toolbox. She argues that ‘ideal’, ‘imagi-
nary’ mathematical entities have been used by mathematicians in their proofs
or theory building whenever the accepted mathematical domain would not
warrant them in pursuing a certain simplification or generalisation of math-
ematics. Thus, the introduction of ideal elements is justified, in the eyes of the
mathematician, on the basis of the following argument:
Premise (1) I, as a mathematician, have the goal (G′′) of remov-
ing exceptions, allowing direct and inverse operations
to satisfy closure properties, and dual transformations
between models to be introduced, whenever possible.
Premise (2) The goal (G′′) is supported by the set of values (V )
and (V ′).
Premise (3) The method of introduction of ideal elements is a
means for me, as a mathematician, to bring about
(G′′).
Conclusion (4) Therefore, I should (practically ought to) introduce
ideal elements. [Cantù, 2013, pp. 86, 88]
The values Cantù recognises as supporting the mathematician’s goal are the
following:
(V ) Value V . The generality of a theory, i.e., its being without exceptions,
is a desirable value in mathematics [Cantù, 2013, p. 83];
(V ′) Value V ′ as a warrant for value V . Generality is desirable because
it increases simplicity [Cantù, 2013, p. 84].
Cantù reconstructs this argument on the basis of writings by Hilbert,
Dedekind, Gauss, and Veronese. The new elements are ideal, or imaginary,
etc. because they might enjoy an ontological, epistemic, or pragmatic status
different from ‘real’ elements. In other words, they might exist in a different
sense; they might be less epistemically secure; or they might be used differently
than real elements [Cantù, 2013, pp. 79–80].
The argument above is supposed to offer a defence of the use of ideal elements
in these mathematicians’ work, based on their own writings on the matter.
Cantù however is not arguing that this argument alone warrants the individual
mathematician’s use of ideal elements — she is noting though that several math-
ematicians use the above argument to justify the adoption of ideal elements in
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subscribes to (G′′), or what happens when (G′′) conflicts with another mathe-
matical goal. Depending on the mathematician, these issues are fended off by
different arguments.1
Having thus settled on a working notion of ideal elements as heuristic tools
having epistemic and/or pragmatic advantages, I now introduce the first of the
two accounts for domain extension via ideal elements that this paper considers.
3. MANDERS’S FRAMEWORK
Manders [1989] proposes to use the notions of existential closure and model
completion from model theory to explain why certain historical cases of domain
extensions, including some important cases of extension via ideal elements, are
mathematically fruitful. Before sketching Manders’s proposal, a few termino-
logical clarifications are in order. For the remainder of the paper, a structure A
is an ordered pair where the first element is a set of individuals, which is what
we call a domain A, and the second element is the interpretation of all symbols
of a given language L in A. For each symbol l of L, if l is a constant symbol
then its interpretation is an element of A, if l is an n-ary relation symbol then
its interpretation is a set of n-tuples of elements of A, and if l is an n-ary func-
tion symbol then its interpretation is an n-ary function on A, that is a function
from An to A [see, e.g., Tent and Ziegler, 2012, p. 2]. Now, let a theory T be a
set of sentences in L. If A makes those sentences true, we say that A is a model
of T [Tent and Ziegler, 2012, p. 10]. We can now say what existential closure
consists in. Roughly, existential closure is the property exhibited by a structure
A, considered as the model of a given theory T , or equivalently, as a member
of a class K of structures (the class of all and only those structures which are
models of T ), whenever A contains in its domain all the solutions to equations
and inequations which can be expressed in the language of A. This language
needs to be a first-order language with no relation symbols.
According to Manders, when performing domain extension via existential
closure, the mathematician is trying to preserve three things: the original
domain of objects, which we want to extend without modifying the objects
we started with; conditions on said objects which we do not want to give up
on, which he dubs ‘invariant conditions’ (‘invariants’ for short), indicated as
ϕ(), ψ(), . . . ; and the properties these conditions give rise to, sentences of the
form ∀xϕ(x), where ϕ() is itself an invariant. While the first one, namely the
objects, are almost always preserved, invariants and the properties they give
rise to sometimes have to be given up in order for the desirable extension to take
place. Manders claims that this (informal) process has a formal counterpart in
the notion of existential closure:
1For a more thorough treatment of objections to the argument (1)–(4), see [Cantù,
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Definition (Existential Closure). Let L be a first-order language with no
relation symbols (but possibly function symbols), and K be the class of L-
structures. Call a formula ϕ primitive if and only if ϕ = ∃ y∧i∈I ψi(y), where
each ψi is either an atomic formula or a negated atomic formula.
Then a structure A from class K is existentially closed (e.c.) in K if and
only if2 for every primitive formula ϕ(x) of L, and every tuple a in A, whenever
there is a structure B in K such that A ⊆ B (A is a substructure of B) and
B  ϕ(a) then already A  ϕ(a).
Manders’s goal is to convince his reader that by using existential closure
(and model completion, where applicable) of contemporary model theory to
conceptualise historical cases of domain extension in mathematics, one can
achieve an analysis of what guides choices of fruitful theories in mathematics.
Manders’s further claim is that, if we understand good domain extensions
in terms of existential closure then we have accounted for the conceptual unifi-
cation such extensions afford (ibid., p. 554). This is how conceptual unification
follows from existential closure. Once a given domain is existentially closed, the
new structure, considered as a model of the old theory, will be such that for
certain propositions, they will either hold universally or not at all (Manders
calls this ‘squeezing out the middle case’). Manders’s example is that equations
of second degree only have a solution in some cases over the real numbers, but
once this is extended to the complex numbers, every second-degree equation
has a solution in the extended domain.
The notion of existential closure is quite common in algebra: we can talk of
an existentially closed (e.c.) lattice, an e.c. group, an e.c. field. One needs to
use some caution, though, when talking about e.c. structures, for the notion
itself is always relative to a class of structures. In the case of fields, for example,
if K is the class of models of the theory of fields then the e.c. structures are
exactly the algebraically closed fields (see, e.g., [Hodges, 1993, p. 362]). If K
on the other hand is the class of models for the theory of ordered fields, then
the e.c. structures are the real closed fields — where algebraically closed and
real closed fields are not extensionally the same class of structures.
If existential closure is, in a sense, quite common, what makes it note-
worthy for the purposes of explaining the advantages of domain extensions?
In short, existential closure can be a stepping stone towards an important
model-theoretic feature of certain theories, quantifier, elimination (or prop-
erties which can approximate the advantages brought about by quantifier
elimination proper). A theory T is said to have quantifier elimination when-
ever, for any formula ϕ in the language of T , T proves that ϕ is equivalent to a
quantifier-free formula. Quantifier elimination is an important model-theoretic
2Existential closure in this formulation is due to [Hodges, 1993, p. 361].
As it turns out, one can strengthen the definition of existential closure so that the formula
ϕ can be any existential formula, instead of just an existential quantifier followed by
atomic or negated atomic formulas. This is just a consequence of the disjunctive normal
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feature for algebraic theories, because it enables the proof of mathematically
rich results such as the Nullstellensatz.3
4. DOMAIN EXTENSIONS AND IDEAL ELEMENTS
Manders’s goal is to use cases of historical domain extensions which turn out to
be existential closures of preexisting models4 as evidence against the claim that
fruitfulness of mathematical theories is an empirical, historical fact. Manders
also suggests that existential closure is the formal model-theoretic notion that
captures (Hilbert’s) method of ideal elements. On the face of it, Manders sees
existential closure as a sufficient condition for the success of certain domain
extensions — in particular, successful domain extensions that Hilbert would
consider as extensions via ideal elements. It is the scope of application of this
explanation that I am interested in probing.
One of Hilbert’s examples for ideal elements are lines and points at infinity.
Manders [1984] shows how, under certain conditions, the models of projec-
tive geometry are existential closures of the Euclidean plane. So in that sense,
Manders’s account is correct in the case of ideal elements in geometry.
What about arithmetic and algebra? Let me start by the easiest case, namely
the complex numbers. If we consider the field of complex numbers C as a
structure in the class of models of the theory of fields, then, since it is an
algebraically closed field, it is actually existentially closed (this follows almost
immediately from the definitions). Moreover, the theory of algebraically closed
fields is model-complete. So Manders’s framework works well for this case —
and indeed, if we look back at how he introduced the notion of existential
closure, he generically spoke of all those cases in which one ‘rounds off’ a math-
ematical domain by adjoining roots. That is exactly one way of constructing
the complex numbers, as R(i). Moreover, his historical discussion in [Manders,
1989] can be seen as a way of demonstrating how the extension of the reals
into the complex number system is one of those instances of domain extension
which does deliver conceptual unity; one can treat equations which used to be
analysed separately as members of one and the same class of equations.
3Nullstellensatz actually is the name given to several theorems of modern algebra,
which however are generalisations of Hilbert’s Nullstellensatz. One standard formulation
of Hilbert’s Nullstellensatz is as follows:
Suppose A is an algebraically closed field, I is an ideal in the polynomial ring
A[x0, . . . , xn−1] and p(x0, . . . , xn−1) is a polynomial ∈ A[x0, . . . , xn−1] such that
for all a ∈ A if q(a) = 0 for all q ∈ I then p(a) = 0. Then for some positive integer
k, pk ∈ I. [Hodges, 1993, p. 366]
The Nullstellensatz is proved via quantifier elimination, and its generalisation called the
Strong Nullstellensatz is used to establish certain results in duality theory. [nLab, 2019]
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4.1. Infinitesimals As Ideal Elements
The next case one may want to consider is that of infinitesimals. Although
infinitesimals are not explicitly listed by Hilbert as one of the canonical cases
of ideal elements in his [1984], nor do they appear to be considered as such by
the other authors Cantù considers,5 I will briefly illustrate how modern authors
such as Robinson [1996] and Goldblatt [1998] present the advantages of working
in nonstandard analysis.
In his [1996, pp. 1–3], Robinson writes that the ‘meaning’ of a limit is more
appealing if given in terms of infinitesimals — it is simpler.6 Moreover,
Leibniz’s ideas [that is, infinitesimal calculus] can lead to a fruitful
approach to classical Analysis and to many other branches of mathe-
matics. [. . . ] Infinitesimals have generalisations in topology which lead to
fruitful applications. [Robinson, 1996, p. 2, emphasis added]
Thus, infinitesimals are fruitful; they lead to simplifications and generalisations
in mathematics.
Similarly, one reads in the preface to [Goldblatt, 1998]:
What does nonstandard analysis offer to our understanding of mathemat-
ics? [. . . ] New definitions of familiar concepts, often simpler [. . . ] New and
insightful (often simpler) proofs of familiar theorems. [Goldblatt, 1998,
p. vii]
5With the exception perhaps of Veronese, cf. [Cantù, 2013, pp. 94–95].
6Here is the full quote:
Underlying the fundamental notions of the branch of mathematics known as
Analysis is the concept of a limit. Derivatives and integrals, the sum of an
infinite series and the continuity of a function all are defined in terms of
limits. For example, let f(x) be a real-valued function which is defined for all
x in the open interval (0, 1) and let x0 be a number which belongs to that
interval. Then the real number a is the derivative of f(x) at x0, in symbols
1.1.1 f ′(x0) = ( dfdx )x=x0 = a if 1.1.2 limx→x0
f(x)−f(x0)
x−x0 = a. Suppose we ask
a well-trained mathematician for the meaning of 1.1.2. Then we may rely on
it that, except for inessential variations and terminological differences (such
as the use of certain topological notions), his explanation will be thus:
For any positive number ε there exists a positive number δ such that
| f(x)−f(x0)x−x0 − a| < ε for all x in (0, 1) for which 0 < |x − x0| < δ.
Let us now ask our mathematician whether he would not accept the following
more direct interpretation of 1.1.1 and 1.1.2.
For any x in the interval of definition of f(x) such that dx = x − x0 is
infinitely close to 0 but not equal to 0, the ratio dfdx , where df = f(x)−f(x0),
is infinitely close to a. To this question we may expect the answer that
our definition might be simpler [emphasis added] in appearance, but totally
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Thus, at least some mathematicians seem to argue in favour of infinites-
imals because they allow for more perspicuous proofs, clearer expression of
foundational concepts, and novel results. Working with infinitesimals, they
claim, presents some epistemic advantages. Although the quotes above do not
constitute conclusive evidence in that respect, it seems reasonable to allow
infinitesimals under the umbrella of ideal elements as understood by Cantù.7
Let me now turn to the question of whether the reals, augmented by infinites-
imals, constitute a good domain extension for Manders (and therefore whether
infinitesimals count as ideal elements for him). If one considers the reals
extended by infinitesimals (from now on denoted by ∗R), then the model one
obtains is not the existential closure of R over the theory of the reals. Adjunc-
tions that are conservative over the theory one is considering are not going to
be existential closures, hence they cannot be good cases of domain extension
according to Manders’s framework. In the specific case of the real numbers, any
nonstandard model for the theory is going to be conservative over the theory of
the reals. Hence, the theory of the original model, namely, R, does not undergo
the simplification that Manders is after — i.e., there is no ‘squeezing out the
middle case’, nor any quantifier-elimination kind of simplification occurring.
Thus Manders’s proposal seems to work well in several cases of adjunction
of ideal elements, but not all.8 While this does not undermine his proposal of
existential closure as one sufficient condition for deeming a domain extension
good or successful, it does seem to suggest that his explication of traditional
theoretical virtues via model-theoretical ones is more limited than it might
7Even though I believe there is little doubt that infinitesimals are ideal elements at
least in the epistemic sense, I should note that one would have to be pretty liberal with
what counts as ‘removing exceptions’, if one wanted to argue that Cantù’s argument (1)–
(4) can be effortlessly read off of Robinson’s and Goldblatt’s quotes. Here is one possible
modification of Cantù’s argument: We replace goal (G′′) with goal (G′′′) of making formal
mathematics easier to understand and as close as possible to näıve intuitions, and the
supporting values (V ) and (V ′) with values (V ′′): Ease of comprehension of a mathematical
theory is a desirable value in mathematics, and (V ′′′): Ease of comprehension is desirable
because it increases fruitfulness. Historical proponents of infinitesimal calculus however
may have appealed to the argument precisely as it is in [Cantù, 2013] though.
8Here the reader might wonder what happens if instead of considering R as the starting
point of an extension, as I just did, we consider cases where R is the extended domain — for
example, with respect to Q. It is indeed true that there is a tradition regarding irrational
numbers as ideal elements with respect to Q, and the case of R as an extension of Q could
potentially be problematic for Manders’s account; R is not the existential closure of Q as a
field. Since algebraic closure and existential closure collapse into the same notion for fields,
this means that R is not the existential closure of Q; so it is problematic to accommodate on
Manders’s framework. To this, the adopter of Manders’s framework for extensions via ideal
elements could give two replies. One is that indeed, R can be regarded as an extension of Q
via ideal elements, but only if one departs from the classical mathematician’s viewpoint.
The second is that this is only to be expected, since what makes the real numbers worthy
of the mathematician’s attention is their completeness, and completeness is not expressible
as a first-order formula, while existential closure only deals with preservation of first-order
formulas. One may accept these two replies as satisfactory, but note that they seem to
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seem at first sight. If the adjunction of infinitesimals is not a case of existential
closure, the ‘fruitfulness’ and ‘simplification’ afforded by infinitesimals remains
unexplained on Manders’s framework.
In the next section, I introduce an alternative conceptualisation of domain
extensions and consider whether it can account for the status of infinitesimals
as ideal elements.
5. DOMAIN EXTENSION ACCORDING TO DEDEKIND
In a footnote in his paper, Manders refers in passing to an alternative way of
conceiving of domain extensions for number domains called the Law of Perma-
nence of Forms [Manders, 1989, p. 555]. There he summarises the content of the
law of permanence as requiring that certain universal properties about basic
arithmetical operations be preserved in an extension of a mathematical domain.
Manders seems to dismiss quickly the law of permanence as not being specific
enough in determining what properties are worth preserving in a domain exten-
sion. In order to assess the limits of the law of permanence as an alternative
to Manders’s notion of successful domain extension, in this section I will (i)
briefly discuss the origin of this law, and then (ii) introduce what seems to be
Dedekind’s take on the law of permanence. This will then form the basis for an
alternative (semi-)formal criterion for good domain extension, against which I
will compare Manders’s own.
5.1. The Law of Permanence of Forms
The law of permanence, first introduced by British algebraist George Peacock
(1791–1858), states that the only algebraic laws the mathematician should
accept are those that — in modern terms — are conservative over certain9
results of elementary arithmetic. Peacock introduces said ‘law’ or ‘principle’ in
the context of justifying formal algebra as a generalisation of arithmetic, where
‘formal’ algebra stands for the part of algebra that studies forms (of equations).
A much more detailed discussion of Peacock’s views on mathematics and the
precise role the principle was meant to fulfil in his philosophy of mathematics
can be found in Detlefsen [2005, pp. 271–277]. Here I merely explain the prin-
ciple to the extent that is needed to give some context to Dedekind’s views (to
be examined in the next subsection).
First let us consider one of Peacock’s own formulations of the law of
permanence:
Let us again recur to this principle or law of the permanence of equiva-
lent forms [. . . ]. “Whatever form is Algebraically equivalent to another,
when expressed in general symbols, must be true, whatever those sym-
bols denote.” Conversely, if we discover an equivalent form in Arithmetical
9As we will also see for Dedekind, this restriction of which laws of arithmetic are the
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Algebra or any other subordinate science, when the symbols are general
in form though specific in their nature, the same must be an equivalent
form, when the symbols are general in their nature as well as in their
form. [Peacock, 1830, §132, p. 104]
‘Arithmetical Algebra’ in the passage above just is arithmetic, and ‘Symbolic
Algebra’ is algebra. Peacock’s claim is that expressions of elementary arithmetic
such as 5 = 5, or 5 + 5 = 2 · 5, which are valid only for arithmetical quantities,
become laws of symbolic algebra when expressed via symbols that are ‘general
in their form’ (i.e., variables) and ‘in nature’ (i.e., they are allowed to range
over any kind of quantity, not just arithmetical quantities). As the quote below
will clarify, Peacock sees arithmetic and algebra as being connected as a more
specific and a more general formulation of the same science, the difference being
in the semantic value of the symbols deployed by each in the statement of its
propositions:
But though the science of arithmetic, or of arithmetical algebra, does
not furnish an adequate foundation for the science of symbolical algebra,
it necessarily suggests its principles, or rather its law of combination;
for in as much as symbolical algebra, though arbitrary in the authority
of its principles, is not arbitrary in their application, being required to
include arithmetical algebra as well as other sciences, it is evident that
their rules must be identical with each other, as far as those sciences
proceed together in common: the real distinction between them will arise
from the supposition or assumption that the symbols in symbolical algebra
are perfectly general and unlimited both in value and representation, and
that the operations to which they are subject are equally general likewise.
[Peacock, 1834, p. 195, emphasis original]
The principle roughly prescribes that ‘symbolic algebra’ is, for the most
part, a recasting in variables of the already well-known truths of ‘arithmetical
algebra’. Thus, for example, if in arithmetic(al algebra) one finds that +1−1 =
0,+2 − 2 = 0,+3 − 3 = 0, · · · , in symbolic algebra one can simply assert the
general symbolic principle +a− a = 0.
Peacock however recognises that some of the laws (statements) of his sym-
bolic algebra may not be so ‘derived’ (or to use Peacock’s own terminology,
‘suggested’) from arithmetic. It is therefore necessary to offer a principled way
of guiding formation of new principles in symbolic algebra, and what Peacock
offers is more or less a conservativity criterion. If a certain statement is true
in arithmetic, then one cannot accept into symbolic algebra another statement
that would contradict the arithmetical one.
Peacock’s law, as Detlefsen [2005, p. 272] also points out, was already some-
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the German-speaking context by Hankel [1867, pp. 11, 15].10Thus, even though
I could not find direct evidence of Dedekind’s having read Peacock’s writings,
there does seem to be a similarity in the mathematicians’ ideas about gen-
eralisation of arithmetic via algebra, and extension of functions and domains
in mathematics, respectively. Dedekind [1854] can be read as offering a crite-
rion for fruitful domain extension which is strongly reminiscent of Peacock’s
principle. This is also noted by Ferreirós [2007, p. 219], who writes:
This principle [Dedekind’s, author’s note] is analogous to Ohm’s ideas on
how to generalize arithmetical operations, and to the famous ‘principle of
permanence’ formulated by Peacock around 1830 (still found in [Hankel,
1867]).
In the next subsection I thus present Dedekind’s analogous ideas on domain
extension as expressed in [Dedekind, 1854].
5.2. Early Dedekind on Domain Extension
Dedekind’s Habilitationsrede [1854] main claim is that, just as in the other
sciences,
In mathematics too, the definitions necessarily appear at the outset in
a restricted form, and their generalisation emerges only in the course of
further development.
He then follows immediately with a remark that is both puzzling to the modern
reader, and familiar to someone acquainted with Peacock’s principle:
But [. . . ] these extensions of definitions no longer allow scope for arbi-
trariness; on the contrary, they follow with compelling necessity from the
earlier restricted definitions, provided one applies the following principle:
Laws which emerge from the initial definitions and which are characteris-
tic for the concepts that they designate are to be considered as of general
validity.
10On p. 11 one reads:
Der hierin enthaltene hodegetische Grundsatz kann als das Prinzip der Per-
manenz der formalen Gesetzen bezeichnet werden und besteht darin: Wenn
zwei in allgemeinen Zeichen der arithmetica universalis ausgedrückte For-
men einander gleich sind, so sollen sie einander auch gleich bleiben, wenn
die Zeichen aufhören, einfachen Größen zu bezeichnen, und daher auch die
Operationen einen irgend welchen anderen Inhalt bekommen.
(Author’s translation: The introductory base principle herein contained can be dubbed
as the Principle of Permanence of formal Laws and consists in the following: whenever
two forms expressed in general signs of arithmetica universalis are equal to one another,
they should also remain equal to one another when the signs cease to designate simple








at/nkab018/6340113 by guest on 10 August 2021
12 • Bellomo
Note how, just as Peacock rushes to defend algebra as a non-arbitrary gen-
eralisation of arithmetic, so does Dedekind not just for algebra, but for any
extended mathematical definition (or function). How the extension happens is
however somewhat different: for Peacock, the extension concerns the range of
validity of certain algebraic propositions; for Dedekind, the extension seems to
consist in augmenting the domain of objects that fall under a certain concept
(for example, number). Dedekind’s understanding of extension however can be
seen as equivalent to Peacock’s; for concepts are determined by ‘characteristic’
laws which ‘emerge from the initial definitions’ of said concepts. So in the end
to expand a concept in Dedekind’s sense (at least in arithmetic) is the same
as interpreting certain special arithmetic statements as being not just about a
restricted domain, but a wider, richer one. This is Peacock’s law for the per-
manence of forms — the law guiding the generalisation of arithmetical results
to algebra.
There is also a difference in scope between Dedekind’s criterion and Pea-
cock’s law; for Dedekind seems to be offering a (prescriptive, as well as
descriptive) criterion for all conceptual expansions in mathematics, while Pea-
cock seems to be focused on the generalisation (where generalisation consists
in expanding the domain of application of a statement) of arithmetic only.
The claim of similarity between Dedekind and Peacock substantiated, there is
still another aspect of Dedekind’s reflections that is worth mentioning, namely,
his focus on functions, i.e., operations. That is, Dedekind’s criterion seemingly
applies to more than just the extended domain and codomain of functions. His
interest is particularly clear in the following passage concerning numbers and
basic arithmetical operations:
[7] Elementary arithmetic is based upon the formation of ordinal and car-
dinal numbers; the successive progress from one member of the sequence
of positive integers to the next is the first and simplest operation of
arithmetic; all other operations rest on it. If one collects into a single
act the multiply repeated performance of this elementary operation, one
arrives at the concept of addition. From this concept that of multipli-
cation is formed in a similar manner, and from multiplication that of
exponentiation. But the definitions we thereby obtain for these fundamen-
tal operations no longer suffice for the further development of arithmetic,
and that is because it assumes that the numbers with which it teaches
us to operate are restricted to a very narrow domain. That is, arith-
metic requires us, upon the introduction of each of these operations, to
create the entire existing domain of numbers anew; or, more precisely, it
demands that the indirect, inverse operations of subtraction, division, and
the like be unconditionally applicable. And this requirement makes it nec-
essary to create new classes of numbers, since with the original sequence
of positive integers the requirement cannot be satisfied. Thus one obtains
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numbers. Now, after the number domain has been extended in this man-
ner it becomes necessary to define the operations anew [. . . ]. [Dedekind,
1854, §7]
This passage lays bare how domain extension and operation expansion relate
for Dedekind, at least in the case of numbers: the given domain is that of the
natural numbers, and the given operation just successor. From the successor
function one obtains the other direct operations of addition and multiplica-
tion, each defined as iterations of the previously defined function. Once all the
‘direct’ operations are defined, one may want to introduce the inverses. For
addition, this is subtraction. However for subtraction to be defined between
two arbitrary elements of the domain, the domain has to be extended (i.e., the
concept of number is expanded) to include also negative numbers. Similarly,
introducing the inverse operation for multiplication, namely, division, together
with a closure requirement for the domain under the new operation, leads to
the introduction of rational numbers. This iterative construction (introduce a
new operation, then new numbers so that the domain is closed under said oper-
ation) goes all the way up to the imaginary numbers. But with each round of
extension of the number domain, old operations also need to be defined anew.11
Dedekind is not explicit about this, but it seems that what allows the process
to stop is the achievement of a sufficiently rich (number) domain that is also
closed under all the defined operations, taken in their most general form. To
see how one can adapt the ‘definition’ of an operation to an extended domain,
consider Dedekind’s example of multiplication:
We already have a definite example in multiplication. This operation arose
from the requirement that a multiply-repeated performance of an opera-
tion of the next lower rank [Ordnung] — namely the addition of a fixed
positive or negative addend (the so-called multiplicand) — be collected
together into a single act. The multiplier — that is, the number which
states how often the addition of the multiplicand is to be thought of as
repeated — is therefore at the outset necessarily a positive integer; a neg-
ative multiplier would, under this first definition of multiplication, make
absolutely no sense. A special definition is therefore needed in order to
11Note that Dedekind seems to say that at each round of extension, strictly speaking
one is not simply adding new elements to the number domain or redefining operations, but
the whole number domain is ‘creat[ed] [. . . ] anew’. I find it plausible that here Dedekind
is merely recognising that adding numbers to the old domain is effectively a change in the
concept of number. Consequently, adding new numbers yields a rewriting of the definition
of the concept of number altogether, and in that sense, the previously existing numbers
are also recreated once the new numbers are in place. This reading is admittedly weaker
than other readings of Dedekind’s ‘creationism’ about numbers especially in Was sind
und was sollen die Zahlen and Stetigkeit und irrationale Zahlen ([1888; 1872] translated
in [Dedekind, 1963]) as presented, e.g., in [Tait, 1996; Hallett, 2019]. A careful discussion
of the relationship between definitions and creation in Dedekind’s writings goes beyond
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admit negative multipliers as well, and thereby to liberate the operation
from the initial constraint; but such a definition involves a priori com-
plete arbitrariness, and it would only later be decided whether then this
arbitrarily chosen definition would bring any real use to arithmetic; and
even if the definition succeeded, one could only call it a lucky guess, a
happy coincidence — the sort of thing a scientific method ought to avoid.
So let us instead apply our general principle. We must investigate which
laws govern the product if the multiplier undergoes in succession the same
general alterations which led to the creation of the sequence of negative
integers out of the sequence of positive integers. For this it suffices if we
determine the alteration which the product undergoes if one makes the
simplest numerical operation with the multiplier, namely, allowing it to
go over into the next-following number. By successive repetition of this
operation we obtain the familiar addition theorem for the multiplier: in
order to multiply a number by a sum, one multiplies it by each summand
and then adds these partial products together. From this theorem a sub-
traction theorem immediately follows for the case where the minuend is
greater than the subtrahend. If one now declares this law to be valid in
general (that is, to hold also when the difference which the multiplier
represents is negative) then one obtains the definition of multiplication
with negative multipliers; and it is then of course no accident that the
general law which multiplication obeys is exactly the same for both cases.
[Dedekind, 1854, §8]
The ‘original definition’ of multiplication as iterated addition has to be
amended so that it may also be defined for negative factors, because one can-
not repeat an action a negative number of times. Instead, left distributivity is
considered as the ‘general law’ that is to be preserved even in the extended
domain.
At this point it is important to notice an element of imprecision in Dedekind’s
discussion, namely that he seems to be considering simultaneously two types
of what one may call conceptual extensions in mathematics. On the one hand
there is the introduction of new operations (or functions, as per his lecture
title) alongside ‘the chain of previous ones’. This is akin to an expansion of the
language which one uses to ‘talk about’ the domain, and here is an example
of how that is supposed to work. If we keep the domain of a structure A
fixed, we can add, say, relation symbols to the language so as to obtain a
new structure A′ that also interprets these new symbols as well as the old
ones. If we let N be the set of all natural numbers, then we can consider
both the structure N of the natural numbers in the language L = {0,+} and
the structure N′ of the natural numbers in the language L′ = {0, 1,+, ·}. The
domain underlying both N and N′ is the same; no new elements have been added
to N . Yet there is an expansion occurring between the two, which involves
operations and constants only. The second type of extension consists in adding
elements to the domain of functions, or the introduction of new objects under
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be performed between two positive integers, it can be later redefined so as
to allow also negative integers among its domain (and range). This extension
can be exemplified as follows. The L-structure one starts with is N, where the
domain is just N , and the language L comprises a symbol for addition, ‘+’,
that N interprets as the function {((m,n),m+ n) : m,n ∈ N}. One then adds
the negative integers to N , thus using Z as the domain of the new L-structure
Z, and moreover ‘+’ is now interpreted as {((m,n),m + n) : m,n ∈ Z} ⊇
{((m,n),m + n) : m,n ∈ N}. This second change is more straightforwardly
a case of adding elements to the total domain of the model as well as to the
domains of the individual functions. These two (expansion of the language
versus extension of the domain) are, in principle, two distinct kinds of extension,
yet Dedekind does not seem to note this. I believe the reason why Dedekind
does not examine the two cases of extension separately is because he does
not believe one can occur in the absence of the other: if the mathematician
introduces new elements to the domain in question, then she needs to be able
to determine how the old operations or functions apply to the new objects.
5.3. Formalizing Dedekind’s Proposal
As the quote illustrates, there is a lot happening in Dedekind’s text. Hence, in
order to bring out the points of comparison with Manders’s notion of domain
extension, it might be helpful to give a model-theoretic characterisation of
Dedekind’s views. I propose the following:
Definition (Dedekind-extension). Let L, L′ be two first-order languages
without relation symbols such that L ⊆ L′. Let A be an L-structure. Then a
Dedekind-extension of A consists in finding a class of L′-structures K such that
for all B ∈ K:
(i) A ⊆ B  L;
(ii) B  ∀xϕ(x) whenever A  ∀xϕ(x), ϕ a quantifier-free, positive formula in
L′.
Condition (i) of the definition asks that A be embedded in B. This ensures
the preservation of functions among the individuals of the original model A, if
the languages L, L′ include function symbols interpreted in A and B.
Condition (ii) aims to capture Dedekind’s rule about certain laws that are
to be considered ‘as of general validity’. The positivity restriction on ϕ is moti-
vated by technical issues one would otherwise encounter,12 and also by the fact
that equations seem to have a privileged status over inequations. Preservation
12Consider for example Z as A, Q as B. If the formalization is to capture Dedekind’s
notion of good domain extension, then Q should turn out to be one such for Z. In order to
do that, my definition needs to rule out, e.g., ∀x 2x = 1 from the class of sentences which
one wants to preserve between Z and Q, and one way of doing that is by excluding order
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of equations is an important theme of results in universal algebra, as witnessed
by the stream of research in universal algebra consisting in generalisations and
applications of Birkhoff’s theorem.13 Moreover, other nineteenth-century math-
ematicians such as Hankel [1867, pp. 26, 40–41], and Peacock [1834] implicitly
recognise the importance of preserving equations when extending the num-
ber domain and arithmetical operations. Thus the restrictions on ϕ in the
formalization do not have to be seen as arbitrary.
To be clear, the definition of Dedekind-extension alone does not answer the
question of whether a given mathematical domain is or is not a good domain
extension of another domain, according to the view I ascribe to Dedekind. The
choice of languages L, L′ also plays a non-trivial role in that sense. Consider
for instance the following example: let N, Z be the models under consider-
ations, with < ∈ L. Then Z cannot be a Dedekind-extension of N, because
N  ∀x(x > 0), which is false in Z. If we exclude < from our language, however,
the problem does not arise and Z can be considered a Dedekind-extension of N.
This means that the notion of Dedekind-extension is still, to some extent, con-
text dependent. This however is also true of Manders’s notion, for existential
closure and model completion are also language sensitive.
6. EXTENDING THE CONCEPT OF NUMBER
In the previous section, I presented Dedekind’s 1854 reflections as suggesting a
conception of domain extension akin to that underlying the principle of perma-
nence of equivalent forms, and I proposed a model-theoretic semi-formalization
of the criterion. This was done in an attempt to make progress on the nor-
mative question of what makes certain domain extensions ‘good’. At the same
time, work in the previous section might leave the reader wondering about
the historical question of whether the criterion thus formalized truly does jus-
tice to Dedekind’s attitude towards new number systems being developed in
the mid-1850s. To answer this question, I briefly recall in this section two such
number-theoretic developments and argue that in both cases it appears unlikely
that Dedekind would regard them as extensions in the sense of his [1854].
6.1. Quaternions, Octonions and Other Hypercomplex Numbers
The first case in consideration is that of quaternions, or so-called hypercomplex
numbers more generally.
A hypercomplex number is traditionally any number belonging to a (uni-
tal) algebra constructed on top of the real numbers. There are several distinct
hypercomplex number systems that can be defined as vector spaces over the
real numbers; quaternions and octonions are the number systems of dimensions
4 and 8, respectively as their names suggest. This means that each quaternion
13The theorem states that a class of algebras K is equationally axiomatisable if and
only if it is a variety — i.e., if and only if it satisfies certain closure properties. Establishing
that a class of algebras is a variety is easier than having to give an axiomatisation of a
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can be represented by a quadruplet of real numbers, while each octonion can be
represented by an octuplet (or 8-tuple). The problem is that multiplication in
quaternions is not commutative, and in the octonions it even fails to be associa-
tive. But commutativity and associativity of multiplication are expressible as
universal positive statements of the kind a Dedekind-extension should preserve,
by definition. This makes clear that the proposal at hand, although inspired by
Dedekind, cannot account for these extensions as good extensions.
Dedekind writes on the hypercomplex numbers in two papers [1885; 1887]),
and in both papers his presentation consists in letting the hypercomplex num-
bers be expressible as finite sums of the form Σ ξιeι, where eι is a ‘principal unit’
(Haupteinheit) of the hypercomplex numbers (think i, j, k for quaternions).
Then operations between any two hypercomplex numbers can be defined as
operations on the units, which taken together form a basis. These operations
can be expressed as linear transformations, that is, matrices, and some of their
crucial properties are therefore determined by the value of the determinant of
the corresponding matrix. This is what Dedekind is concerned with in these
writings.
By way of conclusion in the 1885 paper, Dedekind writes (author’s transla-
tion):
[. . . ] every system of n principal units, as it happens in Mr Weierstrass’s
investigation, may always be understood as an n-valued system from n
ordinary numbers, in this way, that each rational equality between the n
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n derived by us. So if we want to speak of such complex
quantities as new numbers (which to me is inexpedient, because in our
higher algebra there always emerge multi-value quantity systems in the
manner here described), this can only be done though in a completely
different, and indeed infinitely weaker sense, than in the introduction
of imaginary numbers by hefty enrichment of the real-number field, or
also in the introduction of Hamilton’s quaternions, which although their
usefulness seems to be limited to a very small field, make an unconditional
claim to the character of novelty against the other numbers. ([Dedekind,
1885], in [Dedekind, 1931, p. 16])
If on the one hand this supports my interpretation that hypercomplex num-
bers are not genuine new numbers, it also undermines the idea that quaternions
count as a special case of hypercomplex numbers in that respect. Dedekind
considers them ‘new enough’ to count as genuine new numbers. So we are left
with the following: the Dedekind-inspired account correctly aligns with a dis-
tinction between two cases of extension — namely, a domain extension due
to expanding the very concept of number (such would be the quaternions) —
and number domains obtained as unique extensions (up to isomorphism) of
the natural numbers. My definition of Dedekind-extension adequately captures
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numbers, quaternions included, despite what Dedekind writes in the excerpt
above.
So, when it comes to numbers obtained by adjoining new imaginary units,
it seems that Dedekind draws the line at quaternions in terms of what counts
as genuine new numbers. For, if on the one hand it already seemed suggested
in his [1854] that both imaginaries and quaternions are numbers, only not
yet equipped with a satisfactory account of how they are obtained, on the
other hand these number systems can be obtained in roughly the same way as
hypercomplex numbers; so one would expect Dedekind to regard all these as
either uniformly in or uniformly out of the category ‘genuine domain exten-
sions’ (something needs to be a genuine domain extension to be a good one,
needless to say). By looking closely at [Dedekind, 1854] one plausible suggestion
is that, although both complex numbers and quaternions are genuine domain
extensions (because in both cases genuinely new numbers are introduced), only
the complex numbers are obtained as a closure of an already accepted num-
ber domain (the real numbers) under a certain inverse operation, namely, the
inverse of exponentiation. Since the definition of Dedekind-extension strives to
capture the idea of good domain extension expressed in [Dedekind, 1854], and
that idea is that one extends domains to close them under operations, it is a
positive feature of the definition of Dedekind-extension that it is satisfied by
the complex numbers as an extension of the real numbers, but not by quater-
nions, since it is only complex numbers that are introduced as closure of the
real numbers under square roots.
6.2. Dedekind’s Ideals and Ideal Elements
A second case of what one might want and expect to turn out a case of ‘good
extension’ for Dedekind is Dedekind’s own ideals, or ideal numbers more gener-
ally. Ideal numbers were first introduced by Kummer in 1846 [Bordogna, 1996,
p. 6; Edwards, 1980, p. 322] to solve the specific problem of uniqueness of
factorisation for certain number domains. Unique factorisation in the case of
natural (or even integer) numbers is pretty straightforward: for any non-prime
natural number n, there is a unique decomposition of n into its prime factors,
that is, into numbers that themselves cannot be written as the product of any-
thing but themselves and the unit. While Kummer first introduced talk of ‘ideal
numbers’ or ‘ideal divisors’ as numbers that exist beyond (outside) the domain
of real (i.e., existing in reality) numbers, and seemed to consider these as addi-
tional numbers to be added to the already existing ones, Dedekind’s position on
the status of his ideals (and the corresponding ideal numbers) is not as clear. In
the upcoming subsection, I will sketch Dedekind’s second version of the theory
of ideals. On the basis of this sketch I will then be able to address the question
of what kind of domain extension it is, if it is one at all. For interested readers
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6.2.1. The Class of Ideals and Dedekind’s ‘Rigorous Definition of Ideal
Numbers’
Dedekind presented his theory of ideals first in his supplements to Dirichlet’s
Lectures on Number Theory [1877; 1999], and then in a series of papers in
the Bulletin des Sciences Mathématiques et Astronomiques [Dedekind, 1876;
1877]. In his Bulletin formulation of the theory, Dedekind comes to a ‘precise’
definition of ideal number in the following way.
The starting point is a finite degree extension (in the technical sense of a
field, which can be seen as a one- or two-dimensional vector space over Q) Ω
of Q. In this field one identifies a subring of elements that for the purposes of
divisibility behave similarly to the integers. This is the ring of integers o of the
field Ω. The problem is that, in general, unique factorisation will fail in o. The
point of introducing ideal divisors is to retrieve partially some of the advantages
of unique factorisation even in the cases where it strictly speaking fails. Viewed
as a set, o is not just a subring of Ω; it is also an ideal, where an ideal I is a
set of elements that is also an additive subring of the original ring R, and for
any element r ∈ R and p ∈ I, rp ∈ I.
Throughout, Dedekind is actually considering ideals of the ring o. I can now
sketch Dedekind’s definition of an ideal number (or divisor). Dedekind shows
that for any ideal a, there is a positive integer h such that ah = {αh;α ∈ a} is a
principal ideal, i.e., ah = {bα1; b ∈ o} for some α1 in o. From this it immediately
follows that any αh in a is of the form bα1 for some b, and thus that α itself is
divisible by μ = h
√
α1, and μ is an ‘algebraic integer’ that does not belong to
the field one started with, Ω. Dedekind thus writes:
Thus the ideal a is composed of all the integer numbers contained in Ω
and divisible by the integer μ; for this reason we will say that the number
μ, although not contained in Ω, is an ideal number of the field Ω, and that
it corresponds to the ideal a.14 [1877, p. 246]
Dedekind stops short of identifying an ideal containing all the numbers
divided by a certain ideal divisor with the ideal divisor itself. This distinc-
tion might seem analogous to that which Dedekind draws in the case of real
numbers and cuts, where Dedekind says that to each cut that is not generated
by a rational number there corresponds an irrational number, without saying
that the cut and the number are one and the same.15 One might then consider
it a shallow distinction that should not be taken at face value. However there
is a substantial difference between the way Dedekind then handles the real
numbers versus the number domain he defines ideals over, once the ideals have
been defined. In the first case, Dedekind tries to establish that the cuts taken
14Donc l’ideal a est composé de tous les nombres entiers contenus dans Ω et divisibles
par le nombre entier μ; pour cette raison nous dirons que le nombre μ, lors même qu’il
n’est pas contenu dans Ω, est un nombre idéal du corps Ω, et qu’il correspond à l’ideal a.
15For a discussion of Dedekind’s views on cuts and real numbers, and attending
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collectively as one domain, satisfy certain arithmetical and order properties. He
thus establishes some continuity between the cuts and the irrational numbers
they determine, and the arithmetic of natural numbers. If one looks at how
Dedekind treats the integers and the rational numbers16 one sees these steps
have in common that the new numbers are defined as (ordered) pairs of the
old numbers, and the arithmetic operations on the new numbers are defined
in terms of the operations on the old numbers. Moreover, Dedekind seems to
have a sense of the newly defined numbers as forming a new whole, a new
structure (system), having certain arithmetical properties (for example, in the
case of the integers, commutativity of addition and distributivity laws for addi-
tion and multiplication) that also hold for the natural numbers. It seems to me
that no analogous interest can be detected in Dedekind’s work on ideals. He is
not trying to show that there is some deep continuity between the arithmetical
properties of the natural numbers and the arithmetical properties of these puta-
tive new numbers (even though one might say that they are generated because
of an investigation of divisibility and the fundamental theorem of arithmetic,
and are therefore what one obtains when trying to define ‘divisibility’ in its
most general form, i.e., extend divisibility, in some sense).
6.3. Are Ideals and Hypercomplexes Good Dedekind-Extensions?
In the presentation of the ideals at hand, Dedekind explicitly distances
himself from Kummer’s approach to the ideals, which renders them as non-
existing numbers which are only individuated by divisibility rules given through
cumbersome equations [Bordogna, 1996; Edwards, 1983].
Dedekind by contrast defines ideals as classes of (complex) numbers. He
claims that these equivalence classes are not to be seen as additions to the
number domain. In other words, he does not see himself as having expanded
the domain.
This is in accordance with the way extensions of the number concept are
presented in the Habilitation. For Dedekind’s ideals to count as new numbers,
one should expect Dedekind to try and prove that the number domain extended
to include the ideals still preserves certain ‘laws’ that were true of the same
domain without the ideals. But Dedekind does not do that. Specifically, he does
not try to prove that the fundamental arithmetical operations are preserved in
the extension.
Similarly, such a concern seems to be absent from his treatment of hyper-
complex numbers. Given that still in his [1872] and [1888] Dedekind proudly
refers to [Dedekind, 1854] as a script the aim of which Gauss himself approved,
it seems unlikely that he would not take notice of an extension of the concept
16Dedekind offers a construction for each of these in the Nachlass. I was able to gain
access to his notes on the integers thanks to Emmylou Haffner, but not to those on the
‘analogous construction’ for the rationals, and am therefore relying on Sieg’s and Schlimm’s
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of number, namely, the hypercomplex numbers, which does not tally with his
description of what constrains such extensions.
I therefore favour a different position when it comes to ideals and hyper-
complex numbers, namely, these are not meant to be extensions in the sense
of [Dedekind, 1854]. There are two reasons for this position. First, as already
mentioned, both cases present us with a conundrum: a (putative) case of exten-
sion that does not seem to satisfy Dedekind’s criterion for a good extension.
Second, I believe there is enough textual evidence to suggest that Dedekind
treats these two cases differently from the way he treats the integers (as exten-
sions of N), the rationals, and the reals. (The case of complex numbers is not
an issue, for it comes out as a good domain extension on my semi-formal ren-
dition of Dedekind’s 1854 criterion, and Dedekind himself does consider those
as extending the real numbers). I believe that the latter (integers, rationals,
reals, complexes) are genuine extensions of the number concept for Dedekind
in a way that ideals and hypercomplex numbers are not, and this much is also
what my semi-formalization of Dedekind’s criterion suggests.
7. COMPARISON
If one considers Dedekind’s criterion for extension, then the number-domain
cases which Dedekind is interested in (extensions from N to Z all the way up to
C) come out as good cases of domain extension — if one limits the signatures
so as to exclude order; otherwise, already Z as an extension of N would not
satisfy condition (ii) in Dedekind’s definition.
R(i), for example, would be a structure obtained as completion of another
one, namely R. One starts with domain R, adds one new element, i, and then
adds also all the appropriate algebraic combinations of i with all the elements
of R. It also seems that in the process we have been conservative over R as a
field (not as an ordered field though, given that R is linearly ordered whereas
R(i) is not). Thus this particular example is a ‘good case’ extension both for
Manders and for Dedekind.
The extension from R to ∗R also counts as a good domain extension under
Dedekind’s framework, unlike under Manders’s. This is a significant difference
which can be explained in terms of what the two different frameworks are
trying to capture. Manders’s use of existential closure is meant to capture cases
of domain extension that aimed at gaining simplification in terms of reduced
quantifier complexity of the theory. Dedekind’s extension, on the other hand,
is meant to capture cases of domain extension that aim at extending a given
concept (e.g., that of addition or of number) as much as the essence of the
concept allows.17
17This remark might spur some readers to think that the case of forcing extensions in
set theory are the kind of extensions that Dedekind should be able to account for. I have
two replies to this issue. First, I am interested in Dedekind’s notion of domain extension
primarily in the instance where the elements added are ‘ideal elements’. To the best of my
knowledge, forcing extensions are not discussed in those terms in the literature. Secondly, a
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In the previous section I touched upon two prominent cases of putative
domain extension and concluded that they seem not to qualify as such under
my interpretation of Dedekind. We now turn briefly to the question of whether
quaternions and ideals are well handled by Manders’s notion. Quaternions (H)
are not obtained as an existential closure of C, given that C is already existen-
tially closed and not isomorphic to H. At the same time, it is not straightforward
that there should be some class of structures K over which H is existentially
closed. Similarly for ideals defined over some field. Without such results then,
one cannot definitively rule whether quaternions and ideals count as good
domain extensions for Manders.18
In Section 3 I explained how Manders argues that for any theory such that
each solvability condition has one weak complement, existential closure yields
simplification and conceptual unification [Manders, 1989, pp. 554–556]. Man-
ders spells out simplification and unification in terms of formal properties of the
theories of the existentially closed models one obtains. In other words, Man-
ders suggests that existential closure is a sufficient condition for considering a
domain extension as a good, fruitful one,19 and he points out that a few his-
torically important cases (complex numbers, points, and lines at infinity) are
indeed cases of existential closure. As such, they really are a means of partially
pursuing goal (G′′): via results like the Nullstellensatz, they allow ‘dual trans-
formations between models to be introduced’, and in virtue of what Manders
calls the ‘squeezing out the middle case’ property, they remove exceptions.
of theories in the language of set theory would be one requiring preservation of absolute,
that is, Δ0 notions between the original structure and the extension.
18Given that on the face of it hypercomplex numbers and ideals do not seem to fall
straightforwardly in the category of good domain extensions under either of the frameworks
considered here, one might wonder whether a satisfactory account of domain extension is
one that validates hypercomplex numbers and ideals as good domain extensions.
My semi-formalization of Dedekind’s proposal allows considering commutativity of
addition and multiplication as some of the laws any extension of the number concept
(or of a number domain) should preserve. This has as a straightforward consequence that
the quaternions therefore cannot count as a case of Dedekind-extension. Moreover, it is
consistent with my explanation of what Manders’s criterion is supposed to capture and
what Dedekind’s is supposed to capture that neither would then consider ideals and hyper-
complex numbers as good extensions. For Manders’s sufficient criterion, I believe, captures
the cases of domain extension that are motivated by adjoining solutions to equations that
are expressible, though unsolvable, in the original domain. Clearly, hypercomplex numbers
and ideals are no such things. Dedekind’s criterion on the other hand ought to capture the
cases of domain extension that originate from expanding the domain of well-definedness
of algebraic operations as much as possible. I want to also argue that introduction of
ideals is not brought about by wanting to ‘close’ a domain under some operations — that
is, functions — on the original, restricted, domain, which is the kind of domain exten-
sion I take Dedekind’s notion to capture. The problem of course is that this makes both
accounts (Manders’s and mine, based on Dedekind) somewhat normative, instead of merely
descriptive.
19More precisely, Manders suggests that for theories satisfying certain properties,
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Dedekind’s notion, meanwhile, focuses on the preservation of certain features
(theorems) of a theory which are considered to be essential to the concepts
involved (of addition, for example). Because of this, a Dedekind-extension pur-
sues the goal (G′′) by allowing direct and inverse operations to satisfy closure
properties. This splitting of goal (G′′) suggests the possibility of using both
Dedekind’s and Manders’s proposal to develop a disjunctive characterisation of
historical cases of ideal elements.
Nevertheless, there is a fundamental conceptual difference between Dedekind
on the one hand, and Manders on the other. Manders insists that, after the fact
of the extension, we might find ourselves in a position to reject properties or
facts which, before the extension, had been considered essential to the concept
that the structure in question was meant to represent or model (in a loose
sense of the terms). As already noted in Section 5, he even refers to Peacock’s
principle of permanence of equivalent forms while remarking that, despite its
prima facie plausibility, it cannot be held true at all times. This seems to be
an irreconcilable difference in the way the two opposing camps — Manders
on one hand, Dedekind on the other — conceive of the goals and benefits of
domain extensions. Preservation of the essence of a function is the criterion, for
Dedekind, that guides the mathematician to extend her functions and concepts
in one way rather than another.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper I started by giving an overview of ideal elements in mathematics,
seen as an example of good extensions of mathematical domains. I considered
[Manders, 1989] as a candidate for a model-theoretic explication of Hilbert’s
method of ideal elements and its role in the advancement of pure mathematics.
Manders’s conception of domain extension however seemed to be ill-equipped
to explain the ‘ideality’ of domain extensions which occur when the mathe-
matician pursues closure under operations, or simplification and fruitfulness
of a different sort than that granted by quantifier elimination. While it is
true that Manders only aims at offering a sufficient condition for success-
ful or good domain extensions, the number and kind of cases which do not
exhibit the model-theoretic characteristics he focuses on suggest that Manders’s
explanation of the fruitfulness of domain extensions is, at best, partial.
In an attempt to shed light on the related questions of how one should
understand attributions of theoretical virtues like simplicity and fruitfulness to
extended mathematical domains (or attending theories), and of whether such
virtues can be reduced to model-theoretic traits of the structures or theories
in question the way Manders suggests we should do, I used [Dedekind, 1854]
as a basis for an alternative model-theoretic criterion of good domain exten-
sions. The upshot of the comparison between Dedekind and Manders is that
they both consider the complex numbers as a fruitful case of domain extension,
but then seem to disagree on most other cases. Quaternions and ideals are not
straightforward to adjudicate on Manders’s framework, but also they do not
seem like the kind of extension his criterion is intended to capture as a good
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The case of the reals with infinitesimals, on the other hand, constitutes a good
extension for Dedekind, although in a way that does not reveal the (epistemo-
logical) advantages of working with infinitesimals. It cannot for Manders. For
infinitesimals then one is left with the following two options: either the under-
standing of ideal elements offered by Manders’s formalization is too restrictive,
because it does not account for the role of ideal elements as ‘proof simplifiers’;
or, if one takes Manders’s proposal as normative, infinitesimals are not ideal
elements after all. However, there might be a third option if one looks more
carefully at the discussion of ideal elements and extensions at the beginning
of the paper, namely one might want to distinguish between ideal elements
which are introduced to round off a domain in Manders’s sense or to simplify
the mathematics in Manders’s way, and ideal elements which are introduced
to satisfy closure under certain operations. Under this suggestion, Dedekind-
extensions are the extensions that involve a genuine enlargement of the domain
of objects in the domain, and an enlargement that achieves closure under certain
operations. This solution would do justice to the historical discussion brought
forward by Cantù, while highlighting both the strengths and potential limita-
tions of the use of model-theoretic concepts to understand domain extension in
mathematics.
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